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ABSTRACT  
 
This thesis explores the linkage between the right to self-determination and democracy. In view of the 
popular uprisings taking place throughout the Middle East and North Africa, it is highly relevant to 
revisit the concept of self-determination. In particular, considering the undetermined nature of the right 
to self-determination, this thesis examines the contemporary legal meaning of self-determination. 
Specifically, it questions the prospects of “the people” to self-determination against the background of 
undemocratic structures at the global level. Following the introduction, the second part of this thesis 
deals with a critical overview of the international legal ideology on self-determination. In the third part, 
the legal content and scope of the right to self-determination regarding its political and economic 
dimension will be explored. Consequently, an examination of Egypt's approaches to self-determination 
will not only illustrate the obstacles to democratization, but will primarily serve as a test case for 
exploring the (in)compatibility of the process of economic liberalization with the right to self-
determination. 
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1 
"The people want the overthrow of the regime."1
 
 
"The will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of government."2
 
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
After the revolution in Tunisia that succeeded in overthrowing President Ben Ali, popular 
demonstrations followed in Egypt on January 25, 2011 to protest not only poverty, unemployment and 
corruption but particularly, the autocratic regime of President Mubarak.3 These protests, which led to 
Mubarak's resignation on February 11, were the first on this scale in Egypt since the uprisings over the 
price of bread in the 1970s.4
 After decades of authoritarian rule in Egypt, Western states, first and foremost the US and EU, had 
"neither expected these protests nor, at least at the outset, hoped for them. Mubarak had been a loyal 
ally;
  
5 the speed with which they celebrated his fall as a triumph of democracy was slightly anomalous 
if not unseemly."6 In this regard, the European response to the "overthrow of the regime" echoed for 
the most part the US administration’s call for an "orderly transition" to liberal democracy.7
 The Western interest in the export of liberal democracy is based on the theory of democratic 
peace
  
8 and the notion that liberal democracy is the only type of legitimate governance.9 In the words 
of Francis Fukuyama, Western liberal democracy is "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution 
and [...] the final form of human government."10 Hence, Western liberal democracy11
                                               
1 Political slogan during Egyptian uprising in January 2011. See ICG, Popular Protest in North Africa and the 
Middle East (I): Egypt Victorious? 9 (2011), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-
africa/north-africa/egypt/101-popular-protest-in-north-africa-and-the-middle-east-I-egypt-victorious.aspx. 
 is considered as 
2 U.N. UDHR art. 21, para. 3. 
3 Craig Kanalley, Egypt Revolution 2011: A Complete Guide to the Unrest (2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/30/egypt-revolution-2011_n_816026.html. 
4 Aljazeera, Fresh Anti-Govt Protests in Egypt (2011), 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112663450547321.html. 
5 Holger Albrecht, Authoritarian Opposition and the Politics of Challenge in Egypt, in Debating Arab 
Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes 74 (Oliver Schlumberger ed., 2007). 
6 ICG, supra note 1, at 4. 
7 BBC, Egypt: EU Calls for 'Orderly Transition' (2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12329941. 
8 The theory of democratic peace refers to Immanuel Kant's perpetual peace that may be established if three 
conditions are met: First, states should have a republican constitution that is widely considered to 
correspond to today's liberal democratic constitution. Second, states should join together to a pacific 
federation and third, this federation should be underpinned by a body of cosmopolitan law. According to 
Michael Doyle, states with liberal democratic constitutions are peaceful among each other, because they 
commit to citizens' juridical equality and the protection of fundamental civil rights, representative legislatures 
which base their authority on the consent of the electorate, recognition of private property rights, and a free 
market economy shaped by forces of supply and demand. However, Doyle also acknowledges that liberal 
democracies tend to be war prone in their relations with non-liberal societies. See Immanuel Kant, Perpetual 
Peace, in Kant's Political Writings 93 (Hans Reiss ed., 1991). Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: 
International Law, Democracy, and the Critique of Ideology 35-6 (OUP 2003). Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal 
Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 205, 207-8 (1983). 
9 Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am. J. Int'l L. 46 (1992). Gregory Fox, 
The Right to Political Participation in International Law, 17 Yale J. Int'l L. 539 (1992). 
10 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992). 
11 In this paper I rely on Anne-Marie Slaughter's definition of liberal democracy. In her article entitled 
 
2 
ideal realization of peoples' right to self-determination against the background of a presupposed 
"common evolutionary pattern for all human societies."12 However, if self-determination is necessarily 
linked to Western liberal democracy, it leaves no room for people's own perception of the 
representative form of the government and therefore, it is in itself contrary to self-determination.13
 The right to self-determination of peoples is codified in the Articles 1(2) and 55 of the UN Charter 
(1945) and became just like peace, security and human rights, one of the purposes of the UN.
 
14 Both 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) define self-determination as a human right in Article 1. 
In its first paragraph the Article stipulates: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development."15
 The tendency to Western prescription of liberal democracy is not only contrary to self-
determination, but also conflicts with the Westphalian paradigm. According to this paradigm, states 
determine their own constitutional model on the basis of co-existence and non-interference without 
pointing to a particular model of governance.
 
16 In this regard, traditionally, international law is neither 
related to democracy17 nor any political model.18 However, after the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and state socialism, Western states, above all the US and NATO member 
states, declared liberal democracy and capitalism as positive endpoints of ideology.19
 The idea of the universal validity of both liberal democracy and capitalism underlies an Eurocentric 
linear understanding of modernization. Accordingly, “the future of the peripheral [less-developed] 
countries is supposedly represented by the present modernity of the core countries,”
  
20
                                               
"International Law in a World of Liberal States," she defines liberal democracy as "some form of 
representative government secured by the separation of powers, constitutional guarantees of civil and 
political rights, juridical equality, and a functioning judicial system dedicated to the rule of law." See Anne-
Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 Euro. J. Int'l. L. 503 (1994).  
 basically, the 
US and Western Europe. In this context, political economic development is principally determined by 
endogenous factors, whereby economic liberalization is viewed as necessary condition for political 
12 Id. at 48. Marks, supra note 8, at 33. 
13 David Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination 276-277 (Kluwer Law International, 2002). 
14 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2. U.N. Charter art. 55. Hans Morten Haugen, The Right to Self-Determination and 
Natural Resources: The Case of Western Sahara, 3/1 LEAD 70, 72 (2007). 
15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) Annex, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2200(XXI) Annex (Dec. 16, 1966). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) Annex (Dec. 16, 1966).  
16 Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, the European 
Way of Law), 47 Harv. Int'l L.J. 328 (2006). 
17 For instance, Jan Wouters argues that the neutrality on democracy of traditional international law is 
exemplified by the transfer of debts from undemocratic to democratic regimes. Jan Wouters, Bart De 
Meester & Cedric Ryngaert, Democracy and International Law 5 (2004), 
http://www.ggs.kuleuven.be/nieuw/publications/working%20papers/archive/wp05.pdf. 
18 Id. at 5. 
19 Fukuyama, supra note 9. Sonia Lucarelli, Peace and Democracy: The Rediscovered Link: The EU, NATO 
and the European System of Liberal-Democratic Security Communities 5 (2002), 
http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/00-02/Lucarelli%27s.pdf. 
20 Barry Gills & Joel Rocamora, Low Intensity Democracy, 13 Third World Q. 501, 502-503 (1992). 
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liberalization.21 Hence, democratization and the deconstruction of authoritarianism is assumed to be 
“the necessary and natural product of submission to the rationality of the worldwide market.”22
 As political equivalent of the free market, proponents of this ideology argue, that liberal democracy 
is the ideal model of governance and political foundation for legitimacy. Therefore, liberal democracy 
also constitutes the system that most likely promotes international peace and stability.
 
23 Following this 
assumption, the neutrality of traditional international law regarding the internal form of government of 
states gradually changed.24 For instance, liberal democracy became a condition for state recognition25 
as well as a requirement for membership in regional international organizations such as NATO, 
Council of Europe (COE), EU or Organization for American States (OAS).26
 Assuming the universal validity of both the utopian end of “democratic peace” and the liberal means 
to that end,
 
27 proponents of liberal democracy argue "that the right to [...] self-determination can be 
realized by means of an emerging right to democratic governance."28 However, the association of 
liberal democracy with a supposed state of nature, is ignorant of the way in which the subjugation of 
nation-states' sovereignty under the ideological hegemony of the singular, but exemplary liberal nature 
of the Western world, is in itself illiberal. Against this background, the “natural” linkage between 
peoples' right to self-determination and liberal democracy is controversial, not least because there is 
neither an agreement on the accurate interpretation of democracy,29
 This thesis explores the linkage between the right to self-determination and democracy. In view of 
the popular uprisings taking place throughout the Middle East and North Africa, it is highly relevant to 
revisit the concept of self-determination. In particular, considering the undetermined nature of the right 
to self-determination, this thesis examines the contemporary legal meaning of self-determination. 
Specifically, it questions the prospects of “the people” to self-determination against the background of 
undemocratic structures at the global level. Following the introduction, the second part of this thesis 
deals with a critical overview of the international legal ideology on self-determination. In the third part, 
the legal content and scope of the right to self-determination regarding its political and economic 
 nor is there clarity on the extent 
that the right to self-determination actually requires democracy. 
                                               
21 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press, 1962). Seymour M. Lipset, Some 
Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 69-
105 (1959). Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Unwin Paperbacks, 1987). 
22 Samir Amin, The Issues of Democracy in the Contemporary Third World, in Low Intensity Democracy: 
Political Power in the New World Order (Barry Gills, et al. eds., 1993). 
23 Christoph Zürcher, Building Democracy while Building Peace, 22 J. Dem. 81 (2011). 
24 Simone van den Driest, Pro-Democratic Intervention and the Right to Political Self-Determination: The Case 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, NILR 29, 10 (2010). Wouters, De Meester & Ryngaert supra note 17, at 4. 
25 For example, the European Union made democracy a condition for the recognition of new states in Eastern 
Europe. See Wouters, De Meester & Ryngaert supra note 17, at 17-18. 
26 Id. at 19-22. Roland Rich, Bringing Democracy into International law, 12 J. Dem. 20, 3 (2001). 
27 William Rasch, Sovereignty and its Discontents: On the Primacy of Conflict and the Structure of the Political 
51-52 (Cavendish Publishing, 2004). 
28 In this regard, governance is democratic if political authority is awarded through periodic multi-party 
elections, supported by civil rights and constitutional order committed to the rule of law. See Marks, supra 
note 8, at 2. Fox, supra note 9. 
29 Frank Cunningham, for instance, refers to four main approaches of democratic governance: the 
constitutional, procedural, substantive, and process-oriented approach. For a more detailed elaboration of 
each approach: See Frank Cunningham, Theories of Democracy: A Critical Introduction (Routledge, 2002). 
4 
dimension will be explored. Consequently, an examination of Egypt's approaches to self-determination 
will not only illustrate the obstacles to democratization, but will primarily serve as a test case for 
exploring the (in)compatibility of the process of economic liberalization with the right to self-
determination. 
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II.  CRITIQUE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IDEOLOGY ON SELF-DETERMINATION 
 
The right to self-determination is usually referred to in the colonial context as people's right to establish 
their own sovereign state or to freely associate with or integrate in another state.30 Accordingly, the 
right to self-determination of people under colonialism did not involve legal obligations for states, 
rather it was considered to be consumed as soon as the dependent territory achieved independence 
from its colonial power.31
 The right to self-determination has been recognized as fundamental legal right
  
32 and expanded in 
respect of an internal and an external dimension.33 The external dimension includes the right to self-
determination under colonialism. In contrast, the internal dimension entitles all people to "freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."34 
Hence, political self-determination is understood as the right to directly or indirectly participate in the 
political decision-making process and to determine the structure of the state, the form of governance 
and "persons to be entrusted with political power" without the intervention, manipulation or interference 
of a third state.35 Accordingly, people have the right to act as pouvoir constituant and to constitute their 
own representative and participatory political system.36 Given that the right to internal self-
determination is inalienable and ongoing,37
                                               
30 See Percy Lenhing, Theories of Secession (Routledge, 1998). Stephen Maedo & Allen Buchanan, 
Secession and Self-Determination (New York University Press, 2003). Magret Moore, National Self-
Determination and Secession (Oxford University Press, 1998). 
 it "implies that at any moment in time, the people can 
31 van den Driest, supra note 24. 
32 The right to self-determination has widely been recognized as obligation erga omnes. The International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in the Barcelona Traction case (1970) that there are obligations erga omnes in 
international law that are owed by states "towards the international community as a whole," and that 
therefore, "all states can be held to have a legal interest in their protection." See Case Concerning the 
Barcelona traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5) (Judgment). In 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ identified 
the right to self-determination as obligation erga omnes. See On the Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136. Other 
documents suggest that the right to self-determination has also the status of jus cogens (peremptory norm in 
times of war or peace). See U.N. C.H.R., 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2000/4 (Apr. 7, 2000). 
Commentary on art. 26 (5), Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (with 
commentaries), in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, UN 
GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Aug. 10, 2001), reprinted in James Crawford, The International Law 
Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (CUP, 2002). Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 90 (Feb. 3) 
(separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard). 
33 van den Driest, supra note 24. 
34 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) Annex, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2200(XXI) Annex (Dec. 16, 1966). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) Annex (Dec. 16, 1966).  
35 Jan Klabbers & Rene Lefeber, Africa: Lost Between Uti Possidetis and Self-Determination, in Peoples and 
Materials in International Law 43-44 (Catherine Brölmann et al.,1993). 
36 Allan Rosas, Internal Self-Determination, in Modern Law of Self-Determination 201 (Christian Tomuschat 
ed., 1993). 
37 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 12: Article 1: The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples 
(1984), 
http://www.ccprcentre.org/doc/ICCPR/General%20Comments/HRI.GEN.1.Rev.9%28Vol.I%29_%28GC12%2
9_en.pdf. 
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change or re-create the manifestation of their system of government and administration."38
 According to Rosalyn Higgins, the contemporary concept of internal self-determination is a non-
sessionist right of people within an independent state.
  
39 Likewise, Christian Tomuschat and Thomas 
Franck emphasize the universal applicability of self-determination as international human right and 
associate it with an emerging "norm of democratic governance" in international law.40 Hence, 
democratic governance is understood as political foundation for legitimacy and therefore, a criterion in 
the recognition of states.41
 This notion of an international "right to democratic governance"
 
42 has been interpreted by some 
Western states as imperative to "do everything possible to promote [their conception of] democracy in 
the world," including pro-democratic military interventions.43 Traditionally, international law has not 
attended to national constitutional issues such as how a constitution is made or whether the internal 
structures of states are legitimate.44 For instance, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter stipulates that neither 
UN nor UN members have the authority to intervene "in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state."45 In this regard, Jan Wouters and Bart De Meester argue that the 
definition of a constitutional model is "undoubtedly the nec plus ultra of a matter under the national 
jurisdiction."46 However, as the cases of post-conflict constitution-making in Iraq and Afghanistan 
illustrate, constitution-making has become a shared international effort to promote liberal democracy.47
 In view of the interpretation of the "right to democratic governance" as right to liberal democracy, 
Brad Roth and Susan Marks argue that such an interpretation deprives international law "of its 
indispensable role as an overlapping consensus among societies that otherwise radically differ on 
fundamental matters."
 
48
                                               
38 Raic, supra note 13, at 237-238. 
 On the contrary, such an interpretation of the "right to democratic 
governance," might be exemplary for the democratic deficit of international governance as well as for 
the consolidation of a Western liberal conception of human rights. 
39 A.A. Idowu, Revisiting the Right to Self-Determination in Modern International Law: Implications for African 
States (2008), http://www.eurojournals.com/ejss_6_4_05.pdf. 
40 Franck, supra note 9. Christian Tomuschat, Modern Law of Self-Determination 9 (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1993). 
41 Marks, supra note 8. 
42 Franck, supra note 9.  
43 An example of pro-democratic intervention is the US-led invasion in Iraq in 2003. See van den Driest, supra 
note 24, at 41. On the prohibition to intervene, see Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations: G.A. 
Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970).  
44 Vijayashri Sripati, Faking or Crafting Genuine Constitutionalism? A Critique of the UN's Constitutional 
Assistance in Afghanistan (2008), http://www.soas.ac.uk/cceil/events/file44082.pdf. 
45 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. In Article 2(4) the UN Charter further emphasizes that states are not authorized 
to impose democracy by forcible means. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. In the Nicaragua case the International 
Court of Justice affirms that the principle of non-intervention - the right of every state to conduct its affairs 
and to choose its own form of government without outside interference - as customary international law. 
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1989 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
46 Wouters, De Meester & Ryngaert supra note 17, at 3. See International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) Annex (Dec. 16, 1966). International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) Annex, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2200(XXI) Annex (Dec. 16, 1966).  
47 Sripati, supra note 44, at 12. 
48 Marks, supra note 8. 
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 With respect to the democratic deficit of international governance, organizations such as the UN, 
exercise political authority without democratic accountability.49 For instance, the Security Council (SC) 
increasingly creates, de jure or de facto,50 "legal norms and attach consequences to non-
compliance."51 Although democracy is not a UN membership requirement,52 the SC authorized the use 
of force to restore "democratic governance" in several instances.53 In the context of "democracy 
consolidation" and "reconstruction," the UN promotes "good governance,"54 which "brings to its 
ultimate consequences liberal approaches to democracy."55 In this regard, Laura Zanotti notes that 
"development" is mainly framed as internal problem. Consequently, "[i]t's causes are not to be 
researched in the international economic order, capital concentrations or distribution of wealth, but 
mainly in the inappropriate functioning of the institutions of less-developed states."56
overcome the democratic deficit in international settings including the "'private' domain of global 
markets."
 However, given 
that the "fate of national communities is increasingly shaped by decisions taken outside the framework 
of national political institutions," democracy - which ideally functions as "key indicator of legitimacy for 
the exercise of political authority" at the national level - must go beyond national institutions to  
57
 As a consequence of the democratic deficit of international governance, there is no "global public 
that defines itself by reference to the exercise of global regulatory functions or that possesses the 
  
                                               
49 The democratic deficit of the UN is a consequence of the in-existent separation of powers within the 
organization. Particularly, the SC, as sole executive power, is characterized by systemic arbitrariness. For 
instance, the adoption of SC resolutions under Chapter VII, exclusively depends on the interests of the five 
permanent member states. Hans Köchler, Security Council Reform: A Requirement of International 
Democracy 3-4 (2007), http://www.hanskoechler.com/Koechler-Security_Council-Reform-CSF-TurinV3-
25Aug07.pdf. Wouters, De Meester & Ryngaert supra note 17, at 1. 
50 Jost Delbrück, Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State: Transnational Democracy and /or Alternative 
Legitimation Strategies?, 10 Ind. J. of Glob. Legal Stud., 29, 35 (2003). 
51 In particular in the field of anti-terrorism and the fight against impunity, "international regulations" of the 
Security Council directly affect citizens, for instance in the case of "smart sanctions" that are directed against 
individuals rather than the state. See Jan Wouters & Philip De Man, International Organizations as Law-
Makers 8 (2009), http://www.ggs.kuleuven.be/nieuw/publications/working%20papers/new_series/wp21.pdf. 
Steven Wheatley, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law: The Role of Non-State Actors 1 (2007) 
http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/pdfs/Nonstate/Paper-Wheatley.pdf. 
52 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
53 SC authorized the use of force to restore democratic governance, for instance, in Haiti, S.C. Res. 940, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994); Sierra Leone, S.C. Res. 1270, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (October 22, 1999); 
Liberia, S.C. Res. 866, U.N. Doc. S/RES/866 (October 5, 1993). See Gerry Simpson, Two Liberalisms, 21 
Euro. J. Int'l. L. 537, 558 (2001). David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the 
Problem? (2002), http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss15/kennedy.shtml. Susan Marks, What 
has Become of the Emerging Right to Democratic Governance?, 22 Eur. J. Int'l. L. 507, 522 (2011). 
54 According to the UN, "good governance" (equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, accountability, rule of 
law) is put into practice through the "holding of free, fair and frequent elections, representative legislatures 
that make laws and provide oversight and an independent judiciary." See UN, Global Issues: Governance 
(2011), www.un.org/en/globalissues/governance/. 
55 Marks, supra note 53, at 516, 523. Laura Zanotti, Governmentalizing the Post-Cold War International 
Regime: The UN Debate on Democratization and Good Governance, 30 Alternatives 461, 479 (2005). 
56 Zanotti, supra note 55, at 479. 
57 Peter J. Schraeder, Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality, 16 Euro. J Int'l L. 1001, 1004 (2006) (book 
review). Susan Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of 
Ideology, 16 Euro. J. Int'l L. 1001, 1002 (2006) (book review). Marks, supra note 8, at 3. Barry Gills, Low-
Intensity Democracy, in Low-Intensity Democracy: Political Power in the New World Order 30 (Barry Gills 
eds., 1993). 
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capacity of (global) opinion- and will-formation (no demos, no democracy)."58 Accordingly, there is no 
"basic understanding of the common good" in international law.59 Hence, the emergence of so-called 
"cosmopolitan values of human rights, democracy and concern for the social welfare of 'others',"60 is 
not based on an "overlapping consensus among societies," rather it is a product of a particular 
moment and place that David Kennedy defines as "post-enlightenment, rationalist, secular, Western, 
modern, capitalist" or what Gerry Simpson calls "liberal anti-pluralism."61
 However, when "the global expression of emancipatory objectives in human rights terms narrows 
humanity’s appreciation of these objectives to the forms they have taken in the nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century Western political tradition,
 
62 it causes the loss of more diverse and local experiences 
and conceptions of emancipation."63
 This is particularly problematic in the context of less-developed states, where the "right to 
democratic governance" is reduced to the promotion of procedural democracy or "low-intensity 
democracy."
 For instance, if the "right to democratic governance" is reduced to 
the "right to liberal democracy," it leaves no room for people's own perception of the representative 
form of government and therefore, it does not only exclude the expression of local experiences and 
conceptions, but is also contrary to the right to self-determination.  
64 Even though, low-intensity democracy closely corresponds with the definition of a 
liberal state,65 Barry Gills points out that "low-intensity democracy" is a form of "cosmetic 
democratisation" that serves "as an euphemism for sophisticated modern form of neo-
authoritarianism,"66 due to it's compatibility with an "unjust and even oppressive, domestic political 
order."67
 While "democracy"
 
68 is a universal principle within international law,69
                                               
58 Steven Wheatley, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law 18 (Hart Publishing, 2010). 
 there is no "right to 
59 Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Pubic International Law: Between Technique and Politics, 70 Mod. L. Rev. 
1, 16 (2007). 
60 Wheatley, supra note 51, at 2. 
61 Gerry Simpson argues that "liberal anti-pluralism" undermines the inclusive conception of the UN Charter 
liberalism (sovereign equality of diverse states), because it determines the status of states by their 
adherence or non-adherence to certain individual rights and international norms. Simpson, supra note 53 at 
542-543 (2001). Kennedy, supra note 53. 
62 An example is Joseph Schumpeter's influential definition of democracy as a "political method [...] a certain 
type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political - legislative and administrative - decisions." He 
defines the democratic method as "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." See 
Schumpeter, supra note 21, at 269. 
63 Kennedy, supra note 53. 
64 The concept of "low-intensity democracy," free and fair multi-party elections and rights of political 
participation, is inspired by Joseph Schumpeter's idea of democracy. See Schumpeter, supra note 21. Gills 
supra note 57, at 3. Susan Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the 
Critique of Ideology, 96 Am. J. Int'l L. 264, 265 (2002) (book review). Thomas Carothers, Empirical 
Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of Democracy in International Law, 86 Pro. Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 264 
(1992). 
65 With respect to the liberal state, I refer to Anne-Marie Slaughter's definition. See Slaughter, supra note 11. 
Marks, supra note 8, at 63. 
66 Gills, supra note 57, at 21, 5. 
67 Marks, supra note 53. Marks, supra note 64, at 265. 
68 There is no general accepted definition of democracy. For instance, the UN makes no reference to 
democracy in its Charter. However, the GA broadly referred to democracy as "based on the freely expressed 
will of people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and their full 
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democratic governance" in international law,70 although, elements of such a right, including political 
self-determination as well as freedoms of political participation, are stipulated in international human 
rights law.71 In this regard, Susan Marks points out that democratic governance is not only about 
legitimating a government by other states as argued by Christian Tomuschat and others.72 Rather it is 
about self-government, in the sense of political self-determination that people freely determine their 
political status without the intervention, manipulation or interference of a third state. In other words, 
democracy entails "an ongoing call to enlarge the opportunities for popular participation in political 
processes and end social practices that systematically marginalize some citizens while empowering 
others."73
 Similar to David Held, Susan Marks notes that while institutions and procedures of representative 
government are significant, they are not the exclusive determining feature of democracy.
  
74 
Accordingly, democracy can not be equated with a particular "institutional structure or constitutional 
arrangements, not even to any consensus with respect to a wide range of values and beliefs."75 
Rather democracy refers to "the basic democratic ideas of popular self-government and political 
equality, ideas which are universal, not in the sense that they will or should be uniformly interpreted 
and realized, but in the sense that they circulate globally and play a part in political life across the 
world."76
 
 
 
A.  Legal Concept of People's Right to Self-Determination 
The right to self-determination was merely a political concept until the Second World War.77 Despite its 
codification in the UN Charter, self-determination was subordinated to the right to territorial integrity78 
and the general commitment to ensuring peace and security in the post war international system.79 
Thus, the Charter refers in Article 1(2) and 55 only broadly to "self-determination of peoples"80 as 
principle and necessary precondition to create "peaceful and friendly relations among nations."81
 In order to complement the Charter provisions, the General Assembly (GA) adopted several 
  
                                               
participation in all aspects of their lives." See G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/1 (September 16, 2005). 
69 Schraeder, supra note 57, at 1001. Marks, supra note 53, at 1001. 
70 Wheatley, supra note 58, at 219. 
71 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) Annex, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2200(XXI) Annex (Dec. 16, 1966). Wheatley, supra note 54, at 220. 
72 Marks, supra note 64, at 265. Marks, supra note 8. 
73 Marks, supra note 64, at 266. 
74 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance 
(Stanford University Press, 1995). Marks, supra note 64, at 266. 
75 Marks, supra note 8, at 4. 
76 Id. at 4. 
77 Jean Salmon, Internal Aspect of the Right to Self-Determination: Towards a Democratic Legitimacy 
Principle?, in Modern Law of Self-Determination 253 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993). 
78 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
79 U.N. Charter ch. VII. Gerry Simpson, The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-determination in the Post-Colonial 
Age, Stan. J. Int'l. L. 255, 266 (1996). 
80 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2. 
81 U.N. Charter art. 55. 
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resolutions as regards self-determination, decolonization and non-self-governing territories.82 An 
important contribution in this regard is Resolution 1514 (XV).83 The Resolution enunciates "the 
necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and 
manifestations," and declares that "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development."84 Thus, in the context of decolonization, peoples in territories "which have not yet 
attained independence"85 were allowed the exercise of self-determination through the establishment of 
an independent state, the free association with or integration to another state.86 Accordingly, the right 
to self-determination of peoples subjected to colonialism was considered to be exhausted "as soon as 
the dependent territory achieved independence from the colonial power."87 It was therefore unclear 
whether the principle of self-determination had developed to a legal right and therefore, whether it 
included legal obligations for states beyond the context of decolonization.88
 Ever since, the legal concept of self-determination has continued to evolve in terms of its status 
and its scope: First, the right to self-determination has widely been recognized as obligation erga 
omnes.
  
89 Second, as to its scope, the right to self-determination has developed with respect to an 
internal and external dimension. The external dimension refers to peoples' right to "choose their 
international political status, and applies in the context of colonial and trust territories;90 and [...] also in 
the context of territories subject to belligerent occupation91."92 In contrast, the internal dimension 
"applies in all contexts to uphold the right of peoples to choose their national constitution, and set their 
national goals, without either outside interference or domestic coercion."93
 
 
1.  External Right to Self-Determination 
In the context of decolonization the right to self-determination is depicted as the right of "colonial 
                                               
82 van den Driest, supra note 24, at 32. 
83 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at 67, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960). 
84 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at 
67, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960). Declaration on Principles of Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the UN, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
85 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at 
67, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960). 
86 G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1541 (Dec. 15, 1960). 
87 van den Driest, supra note 24, at 32. Helen Quane, The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-
Determination, 47 Int'l. Comp. L. Q. 537, 554 (1998). 
88 van den Driest, supra note 24 at 32. 
89 See supra note 32. 
90 These include West Irian in 1962-63, South West Africa/Namibia in 1967 and 1989-90, Western Sahara in 
1991 and East Timor between 1999 and 2002. Ralph Wilde, international Territorial Administration: How 
Trusteeship and Civilizing Mission Never Went Away 188 (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
91 For example, Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as well as the US 
occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq are deemed to belligerent occupations. Nehal Butha, The Antinomies of 
Transformative Occupation, 16 Eur. J. Int'l. L. 721, 722 (2005). Martti Koskenniemi, Occupied Zone: "A Zone 
of Reasonableness?," 41 Isr. L. Rev. 13, 16 (2008). 
92 Marks, supra note 8, at 113. 
93 Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples, in The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 92 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981). Marks, supra note 8, at 113. 
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peoples"94 in non-self governing territories to a particular process:95 the right to freely "determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."96 Hence, the right 
provides for peoples subject to colonial rule to freely choose the international political status of the 
territory they inhabit within their colonial boundaries (uti possidetis),97 whether to establish their own 
sovereign independent state or to freely associate with or integrate in an independent state.98
 Underlying the "free choice" to self-determination are "forms and procedures" that must ensure a 
free (i.e., without outside intervention, manipulation or interference) and genuine (i.e., be the will of the 
people of the territory)
 
99 expression100 of the will of a people.101 Moreover, in absence of "special 
circumstances,"102 "informed and democratic processes,"103 for instance, through a referendum or a 
plebiscite, must ensure the "free choice" of a people.104 Thus, "what amounts to a 'free choice' is not to 
be universally predetermined but rather must be judged according to the particular political desires of 
the particular people."105
 Due to the special status of non-self-governing territories,
 
106 in contrast to the territory of the states 
that administer them,107
                                               
94 "Colonial peoples" may be defined as a population inhabiting a territory which is geographically separate 
from the country administering it; is ethnically and/or culturally distinct from the administering country's 
population; and has not yet attained full self-government. See G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), Principles IV, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/1541 (Dec. 15, 1960). 
 the right of a people to define its  international political status is consumed as 
95 Catriona Drew, The East Timor Story: International Law on Trail, 12 Eur. J. Int'l. L. 651, 658-659 (2001). 
96 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at 67, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960). 
97 Likewise, in the Frontier Dispute case the International Court of Justice states that uti possidetis is not 
incompatible with self-determination, because the latter does not pose a challenge to existing state borders. 
Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 566 (Dec. 22). Jens E. Rytter, Self-Determination of 
Colonial Peoples - The Case of Greenland Revisited, 77 Nordic J.Int'l. L. 365, 367 (2008). Rosalyn Higgins, 
Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it 122 (Clarendon Press, 1994). 
98 Free integration or association with an independent state, however, had to be "the result of a free and 
voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic 
processes." (Principle VII (a) and IX (b). Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at 67, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960). Salmon, supra note 1, at 
255. 
99 Gentian Zyberi, Self-Determination through the Lens of the International Court of Justice, 56 Neth. Int'l. L. 
Rev. 429, 438 (2009). 
100 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 55, 59 (Oct. 16). M.A.Shukri, The Concept of Self-
determination in the United Nations 60, 152, 337 (Al Jadidah Press, 1965). 
101 Drew, supra note 95, at 661. Rytter, supra note 97, at 367. 
102 In his separate opinion Vice-President provides an example of "special circumstances," which include the 
legitimate struggle for liberation from foreign domination. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 99 
(Oct. 16) (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun). 
103 G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1541 (Dec. 15, 1960). 
104 In the context of decolonization, the UN practice has been to organize or supervise self-determination 
referenda and plebiscites. Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 76-78 
(Cambridge University Press, 1999). Drew, supra note 95, at 662. 
105 Drew, supra note 95, at 661, 662. 
106 "The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing territory has [...] a status separate and distinct from the 
territory of the state administering it;and [...] shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing 
Territory have exercised their right of self-determination [...]. Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations: G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
107 Rytter, supra note 97, at 368. Cassese, supra note 104, at 72-73. Micha Pomerance, Self-Determination in 
Law and Practice 9, 25 (Martinus Nijhoff, 1982). 
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soon as it is exercised.108 However, while the right to the process of self-determination is not ongoing, 
it "does not exhaust the content of the right to self-determination."109 In other words, there are 
"additional substantive entitlements beyond the basic right of a people to exercise a free choice" in the 
decolonization context, for instance, the "right to exist - demographically and territorially - as a 
people."110 Moreover, GA Resolution 1514 (XV) makes a specific provision to the right to territorial 
integrity.111 Further provisions are made with respect to the right to permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources,112 the right to cultural integrity and development,113 and the right to economic and 
social development.114 In the South West Africa Decolonization case the ICJ also linked the right to 
self-determination with the respect for fundamental human rights, particularly, through its 
condemnation of the practice of apartheid.115 Self-determination was also applied to the South African 
apartheid and the Southern Rhodesian crisis.116 Therefore, the colonial definition of self-determination 
was expanded to include a racial element, because the salt-water definition of colonialism was not 
applicable: neither the white elite of South Africa nor Rhodesia was connected to an European colonial 
power.117 Accordingly, the meaning of colonization as "alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation"118 is not confined to the colonial context, but "seems to cover all situations where a 
foreign [ = European]119 minority imposes its rule on the majority."120
 In contrast, the colonial definition of self-determination "was defined as the majority right to external 
 
                                               
108 Rytter, supra note 97, at 368. 
109 Drew, supra note 95, at 663. 
110 Catriona Drew, Self-Determination, Population Transfer and the Middle East Peace Accords, in Human 
Rights, Self-Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 133 (Stephen Bowen 
ed., 1997).  
111 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), at 
67, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960). 
112 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (Dec. 14, 1962). International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966). International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 
1966).  
113 Universal Declaration of Rights of Peoples art. 2, 9, 13, 14 and 15 (July 14, 1976). 
114 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) 
(Dec. 16, 1966). International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 
1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966). 
115 The International Court of Justice states that "to establish [...] and to enforce, distinctions, exclusions, 
restrictions and limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin 
which constitute a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of 
the Charter." See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 
57 (June 21). Zyberi, supra note 99, at 435 (2009). 
116 Simpson, supra note 79, at 273. 
117 Id. 
118 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960). 
119 For examples, religious or racially discriminating ruling elites in Eritrea, East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and 
Biafra were not considered as colonial regimes although the indigenous peoples regarded  them as such. 
Pomerance, supra note 102, at 73-76. Benyamin Neuberger, National Self-determination in Post-colonial 
Africa 85 (Lynne Rienner Publishers,1986). 
120 Beyond the colonial context, the GA applied the notion of colonization, for instance, in respect of Palestine, 
the South African majoritarian population and the Cambodian people. G.A. Res. ES-7/2, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/ES-7/1A (July 29, 1980). G.A. Res. 42/43, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/43 (Nov. 20, 1987). G.A. Res. 46/18, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/18 (Nov. 20, 1991). Martti Koskenniemi, National Self-Determination Today: Problems 
of Legal Theory and Practice, 43 Int'l. Comp. L. Q. 241, 247 (1994). 
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independence from colonial domination" by European colonial rule.121 As such, self-determination was 
“primarily designed to foster the decolonization process,”122 and thereby ending European 
colonialism.123 Therefore, self-determination was not applicable to "ethnic groups within these 
territories or to majorities who were being oppressed by indigenous 'alien' elites" nor did it include 
secession or democratic representation.124 Accordingly, self-determination evolved upon the premise 
that as principle it is "fundamentally subordinated to the principle of state sovereignty, including 
territorial integrity of the state,125 which was and continues to be the basic pillar of international law" in 
a state-centered system.126
 As recent cases such as Kosovo
  
127 and Chechnya128 have illustrated, it remains controversial 
whether there is "any legal right to secession under international law - even in situations involving 
gross human rights abuse."129 On the other hand, the notion of internal self-determination that refers to 
internal entitlements within a state, has contributed to the association of the right to self-determination 
with democracy in view of the need to accommodate the rights and claims of inhabitants within a 
territory. In this regard, "the articulation of self-determination as a human right" that has to be in line 
with other individual human rights, may be explanatory for the development of internal self-
determination as an alternative to external self-determination.130
 
 
2.  Internal Dimension of Self-Determination 
Both ICCPR and ICESCR define self-determination as "human right" in Article 1. In its first paragraph 
the Article recognizes this right: "All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development."131
                                               
121 Simpson, supra note 79, at 273. 
 However, the Covenants do not clarify who the "peoples" are upon which the right to 
122 Christian Tomuschat, Secession and Self-Determination, in Secession: International Law Perspectives 23 
(Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 2006). 
123 Simpson, supra note at 79, at 255. 
124 Id. at 273-274. 
125 Higgins, supra note 97, at 121. 
126 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1. Rytter, supra note 97, at 367. 
127 The Security Council resolutions on Kosovo called for "substantial autonomy," and meaningful self-
administration" rather than secession thereby affirming the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. S.C. Res.1160, para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998). S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. doc. 
S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). However, in 2008 Kosovo declared independence. While 85 UN member 
states recognize Kosovo's independence, Serbia refuses to recognize Kosovo's unilateral secession. 
128 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Secretary General: 
The Situation of Human Right in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation, U.N. Doc. HR/99/104 
(Nov. 16, 1999). 
129 Drew, supra note 95, at 657. Secession as remedy of last resort for gross human rights abuse is discussed, 
for instance, by Lee C. Buchheit. See Lee C. Buchheit, Legitimacy of Self-Determination (Yale University 
Press, 1978). 
130 Matthew Saul, The Normative Status of Self-Determination in International Law: A Formula for Uncertainty in 
the Scope and Content of the Right? Hum. Rts. L. Rev. (forthcoming). S. James Anaya, Self-Determination 
as a Collective Human Right under Contemporary International Law, in Operationalising the Right of 
Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination 12 (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000). 
131 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (Dec. 14, 1962). International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966). International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 
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self-determination is conferred. Particularly, it is unclear "whether 'peoples' is a category 
distinguishable from 'states' on the one hand or 'individuals' on the other."132
 The UN Charter refers with respect to self-determination only to peoples of states
  
133 and peoples of 
non-self-governing and trust territories.134 In compliance with the use of "peoples" in the Charter, the 
term has generally been limited to the application to entities, which already have "attributes of 
sovereignty or statehood."135 However, this means that the historical European definition of 
sovereignty as effective control of territory continues to marginalize claims to sovereignty by other 
groups than the "people" of the state, not least because such claims would pose a challenge to the 
territorial integrity of the existing state.136
 This differentiation between minorities and "peoples" is also reflected in the ICCPR. Article 27 on 
minorities states the following: "[i]n those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other 
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use 
their own language."
 Accordingly, minorities are not granted a right to self-
determination.  
137 Accordingly, the right to self-determination is not conferred upon minorities. 
The Article only mentions "rights essential to the defense of minority identity in the face of 
assimilationist pressures: it encapsulates their 'right to an identity'."138 Moreover, these rights do not 
provide a minority for a collective right, rather the Article refers to "persons belonging to such 
minorities" upon which these rights are conferred.139 Accordingly, Article 27 seems to "impose only a 
duty of toleration on states, a duty of non-interference with the cultural and religious practices" of 
minorities.140
 Even though the Covenants do not refer to minorities as "peoples" and they are thus not the formal 
subject of the right to self-determination, this does not mean that self-determination is not relevant to 
them.
  
141
                                               
1966). 
 For instance, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) highlights that "the right of self-
determination is of particular importance because its realization is an essential condition for the 
132 Simpson, supra note 79, at 268. 
133 "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." See U.N. 
Charter art. 1, para. 2. 
134 U.N. Charter ch. XI & ch. XII. 
135 Elena Cirkovic, Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 31 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 375, 
387 (2007). 
136 In this respect, sovereignty was tied to the principle of self-determination, which Woodrow Wilson carried 
forward to “justify the creation of new nation-states out of the multi-ethnic empires in Europe and the Middle 
East” following the end of the first World War. Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht, Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung 180 (Springer-Verlag, 1995). Cirkovic, supra note 
135, at 387. 
137 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (Dec. 14, 1962). International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 27, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966). 
138 Patrick Thornberry, Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments, 38 
Int'l. Comp.L. Q. 867, 880 (1989). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 881. 
141 Id. at 883. 
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effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights."142
 Despite the reference to internal self-determination as human right, self-determination is not an 
"absolute right" as Article 5(1) of the Covenants illustrates: "nothing in the present Covenant may be 
interpreted as implying for any state, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any 
act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein."
 This implies a dialectic relationship 
between the protection of individual rights that benefit all within a state including minorities on the one 
hand, and the exercise of self-determination of a people on the other. Consequently, a violation of 
individual rights is ultimately also a violation of self-determination. Equally, people's right to exercise 
self-determination is not without limitation, because it is connected with the "effective guarantee and 
observance of individual rights." 
143 Hence the 
exercise of the right to self-determination "must be balanced with other human rights, such as freedom 
of expression and freedom of religion."144 In this respect, it is important to note that the responsibility to 
balance self-determination and other human rights in the human rights framework is solely allocated to 
the state.145 On the one hand, the responsibility to balance rights provides states with a legal device 
"to evade what might be deemed, from their perspective, non-desirable implications of [the right to 
self-determination]."146 On the other hand, this also directs "attention to the organization of the state as 
a whole and how that organization favors or disfavors human values to the benefit of all within the 
state, minorities included."147
 
 
a.  Political Self-Determination 
Both ICCPR and ICESCR make reference to political self-determination in common Article 1 as 
substantive entitlement to the exercise of the right to self-determination: "[a]ll peoples have the right to 
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status."148 In contrast to 
external self-determination in the decolonization context, the "free choice" of a people is not concerned 
with the determination of the international political status of the territory, but with "the system of 
government and administration, as well as the substantive nature of [the] political regime.149 More 
explicitly, political self-determination requires that the "political order reflects the will of the people.”150
 As regards the outcome of the free choice of a people, the GA Resolution 2625 linked the exercise 
of self-determination to the requirement of "a government representing the whole people belonging to 
 
                                               
142 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples (Art. 1), 
(1984), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/comments.htm. 
143 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (Dec. 14, 1962). International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 5, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966). 
144 Saul, supra note 130. 
145 Robert McCorquodale, Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach, 43 Int'l. Comp. L. Q. 857, 878 (1994). 
146 Saul, supra note 130. On mechanisms for enforcement of self-determination under ICCPR see Alex Conte & 
Scott Davidson, et al., Defining Civil and Political Rights: The Jurisprudence of the United Nations 33 
(Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004). 
147 Thornberry, supra note 138, at 884. 
148 G.A. Res. 1803 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (Dec. 14, 1962). International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 5, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966). 
149 Steven Wheatley, The Security Council, Democratic Legitimacy and Regime Change in Iraq, 17 Eur. J. Int'l. 
L. 531, 540 (2006). 
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the territory without distinction as to race, creed or color."151 The necessity that the government must 
be of non-discriminative and representative nature is also reflected in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) that provides in Article 21(3) that "[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of 
the authority of government."152
 The exercise of political self-determination therefore postulates that a people is "allowed to exercise 
those rights and freedoms which permit the expression of the popular will."
 
153 Political self-
determination is thus a continuous entitlement to the expression of the popular will and therefore, it is 
to be considered as a "manifestation of the totality of rights embodied in the [ICCPR]."154
 The right to participate in the political decision-making process is decisive for the exercise of 
political self-determination. In the context of citizenship, Hannah Arendt refers to the right to participate 
as "right to have rights,"
  
155 indicating that all other possible rights presuppose membership in a 
political community."156 Moreover, for Arendt, equality is an essential attribute of citizenship that 
individuals "acquire upon entering in the public realm" and which has to be secured by democratic 
institutions.157 That means that decisions, which affect particular groups within a state "should be 
taken, at the very least, with those groups have been consulted."158 In other words, "it it is not enough 
to have a collection of private individuals voting separately and anonymously according to their [rather] 
private opinions".159 Rather private individuals must be able to meet as "subjects of democratic 
debate" in a public-political space160 in order to articulate their differences and commonalities.161
 Political participation may be considered as procedural entitlement of self-determination. On the 
one hand, the right to participate empowers a people to take part in the political decision-making 
process and to decides on who to be entrusted with political power. On the other hand, through 
political participation a people defines and re-defines its public sphere including the system of 
government and the nature of the political regime. Hence, the public sphere may be considered as 
substance of self-determination. As such it is neither universal, nor a "natural predisposition," but 
artificial and constructed, in the sense that the decision on its content requires the political dispute of 
people. 
  
 Popular participation in the political decision-making process can be directly or indirectly exercised: 
                                               
151 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations: G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 
1970). Saul supra note 130. 
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"The notion of direct participation primarily refers to the right to stand for election for the purpose of 
creating a representative government, while the notion of indirect participation generally refers to 
periodic voting processes in order to elect the political representative of the people."162
 
 In Article 25 on 
political participation the ICCPR affirms that right: 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity:  
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives;  
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing 
the free expression of the will of the electors;  
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his 
country.163
 
 
Article 25 on political participation unequivocally implicates the respect for Article 18 on the right to 
freedom of expression, and Article 19 and 21 of the ICCPR on the right to peaceful assembly and the 
freedom of association.164 Freedom of thought and the right to peaceful assembly as well as the 
freedom of association are possible means of implementing the procedural aspect of political self-
determination.165 Without the guarantee of these rights, the right to participate in the political decision-
making process would be meaningless. In addition, the exercise of the right to political self-
determination requires that the government represents the authority or will of its population as a 
whole.166 Hence, "the implementation of the right to [political] self-determination is inextricably linked to 
the principle of equal rights of peoples167 and, more in particular, the principle of non-discrimination."168
 The right to self-determination is often described as inalienable and ongoing.
 
169 This implies that a 
people can change and constitute its own system of government and decide on the nature of the 
political regime.170 Further, "a representative government should allow its people to participate 
continuously in the general decision-making process of the state, in this way substantively - not merely 
formally - determining not only its political, but also economic, social and cultural development."171
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 In 
this regard the HRC notes that "[s]tates parties should describe to the constitutional and political 
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process which in practice allow the exercise of [self-determination]."172 Therefore, policy outcomes of 
the government "may function as a continuous measuring instrument for qualifying a political system 
as participatory and representative, and for checking whether the core meaning of the right to internal 
self-determination is compiled with."173 In a nutshell, the right to internal self-determination in the post-
colonial context empowers the population of a state to participate on an equal basis in the political 
decision-making process and to determine "persons to be entrusted with political power", the system 
of government as well as nature of the political regimes174 without the intervention of a third state and 
without the manipulation or the interference of current political authorities.175
 
 
b.  Economic, Social and Cultural Development 
Common Article 1 the ICCPR and ICESCR stipulates the right of all peoples to: "freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development."176 Likewise, the UDHR proclaims in Article 22 that 
"everyone, as a member of society [...] is entitled to realization [...] in accordance with the organization 
and resources of each state, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity 
and the free development for his personality."177
 
 Moreover, common Article 1(2) of the ICCPR and 
ICESCR provides: 
All peoples may, for their own end, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international 
economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and 
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means or 
subsistence.178
 
 
This provision implies that in order to enable peoples' economic, social and cultural development, the 
natural wealth and resources of peoples must be used "for their own ends." Therefore, the authority in 
charge with overseeing peoples' natural wealth must use these resources to benefit the peoples on an 
equal basis.179 In addition, for peoples to exercise the right to economic self-determination, peoples 
need to be able to "freely dispose" of their natural wealth. The right to free disposition is thus an 
requirement to enforcing the use of resources for peoples' own collective ends.180 Accordingly, peoples 
may not be deprived of their own resources, for instance by "forces outside the control of the 
community."181
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right as stipulated in common Article 1(2).182
 Resources relate in this context to peoples "own means or subsistence" that include "everything 
which is crucial in order to uphold life, of which food is an essential element."
 
183 Given that "[i]n no 
case may a people be deprived of its own means of substance,"184 there is an ongoing and inherent 
right of peoples to mutually benefit from economic development as stated in Article 25 of the ICESCR: 
"[n]othing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to 
enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources."185 The GA Resolution 41/128 on 
development restates this obligation by indicating that the right to development is "an inalienable 
human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, 
contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights 
and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized."186
 Self-determination also requires that peoples have the right to participate "in matters touching upon 
all spheres of life [such as the use of their resources] on a continuous basis."
 
187 Thus, the authority 
controlling peoples' resources must enable peoples' participation in the decision-making processes 
and must be therefore of representative nature.188 Moreover, self-determination requires that the 
organization of the state "be one under which people may live and develop freely on a continuous 
basis."189 In this regard, Article 28 of the UDHR stipulates that “everyone is entitled to a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”190 
This establishes that the respect for human rights “is not a narrowly focused obligation applying only 
within strict limits to relations between individuals and their states, but rather is an open-ended 
obligation applying to all societal relations whether at the local, national or international level.”191 To 
sum up, the organization of the state is not only relevant to the exercise of political self-determination 
and to "freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development," but also to the guarantee of 
individual human rights such as the right to adequate food,192
 
 which benefit all individuals within the 
state.  
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III.  EGYPT'S POST-COLONIAL APPROACHES TO INTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
 
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have been described as exceptional, due to the fact that 
following the end of the Cold War, the authoritarian states within this region have been largely 
unaffected by the "third wave of democratization.”193 On the contrary Western Europe, Latin America 
and many former Communist states are considered to constitute democracies.194 However, the extent 
to which these regimes are indeed democratic, is debatable,195 considering that, being rather formally 
than substantively democratic, they have often failed “to broaden popular political participation.”196 
Therefore, it is an “overstated universalism” to proclaim democratic governance as a global norm, 
given that outside Europe and Latin America perhaps, “there is little evidence of any trend towards 
democracy.”197 Nevertheless, “democracy” is promoted as “the best of all possible worlds both by the 
holders of global power and by 'the people,' not least by those struggling for social justice and self-
determination.”198
 In the “post-Cold War world” the promotion of liberal democracy resembles the foreign policy 
strategy, which Western states have applied, “albeit unevenly, as early as the 19th century, primarily 
within the context of colonization.”
  
199 Considering political economic development as being principally 
determined by endogenous factors, economic liberalization is seen as necessary condition for political 
liberalization and the deconstruction of authoritarianism.200 As political equivalent of the free market, 
liberal democracy is assumed to be the “necessary and natural product of submission to the rationality 
of the worldwide market,”201
 Egypt constitutes a case in point,
  
202 given that efforts to impose economic policies date back to the 
1870s.203
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 In this respect, the establishment of the Egyptian Republic in 1953, has not ended the 
impact of Western economic and political influence. Despite the efforts of economic liberalization in the 
1970s, democratization has been rather limited and authoritarianism remarkable enduring. The 
194 Ellen Lust-Okar, Why the Failure of Democratization? Explaining “Middle East Exceptionalism,” 3 (2011), 
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/seminars/lust-okar.pdf. 
195 Larry Diamond, Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes, 13 J. Dem. 21-35 (2002). 
Thomas Carothers, Democracy without Illusions, 76 Foreign Aff., 85, 86 (1997). 
196 For example, in Latin America political life is marked by severe deficiencies including “weak capacity and 
performance of government institutions, widespread corruption, irregular and often arbitrary rule, [as well as] 
poorly developed patterns of representation.” See Carothers, supra note 195, at 89. Gills & Rocamora, supra 
note 20. 
197 Marks, supra note 8, at 1. Carothers, supra note 64, at 262-263. 
198 Gills & Rocamora, supra note at 20, at 503. 
199 Laurence Whitehead, The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1996).  
200 Gerasimos Tsourapas, Deconstructing Democracy Promotion Strategies: Economic Liberalization & Reform 
in Egypt, (2011), 
http://www.ekemprogram.org/euromedo/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=246:deconstructin
g-democracy-promotion-strategies-economic-liberalization-a-reform-in-egypt-1&catid=37:2010-05-05-10-07-
53&Itemid=59. 
201 Gills & Rocamora, supra note at 20, at 503. 
202 Timothy Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt (University of California Press, 1991). 
203 Tsourapas, supra note 201. 
21 
popular demonstrations that started in 2011 have been particularly directed against the autocratic 
regime. The political demand of the protesters that “the people want the overthrow of the regime,”204
 Against this background, the following examines the post-colonial
 is 
thereby not limited to the removal of the autocrats, but likewise entails the desire for the recapture of 
the political sphere to internal self-determination. 
205
 
 approaches taken to political 
and economic self-determination since the establishment of the Egyptian Republic. In this regard, the 
following not only illustrates the obstacles to democratization in the context of economic and political 
domination, but also constitutes a critical response to the conditions of the world system. 
 
A.  Political Self-Determination 
1.  Authoritarianism under Nasser and Sadat 
Egypt formally gained independence in 1922, however, continued to remain under British military 
occupation and influence. In 1952 a group of Egyptian military officers carried out a regime change, 
which resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy and the ousting of the British military.206
 The new military regime under President Nasser moved Egypt towards "a secular Pan-Arab 
nationalist project combined with a Third World import-substitution vision of economic 
development."
 
Consequently, the 1923 Constitution was abrogated and Egypt was declared a republic. 
207 Contrary to the monarchy under which multi-partyism and political rights were 
guaranteed by the 1923 Constitution, political liberalization and democratization were subordinated to 
the achievement of socio-economic development.208 For Nasser, political pluralism posed a threat to 
national stability and unity,209 given that under the monarchy, the King and the British had furthered 
their own interests through arbitrary interventions in the political process.210 Therefore, in 1953 all 
parties were banned and a one-party system established in which the Liberation Rally (LR) 
represented the only legal political organization. As such, the LR had the mandate to mobilize the 
masses to support the “revolution” and to de-legitimize the monarchy.211
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 The LR was later changed to 
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as instrument for "mass political mobilization and indoctrination."212
 In an attempt to consolidate its control, the regime established several exceptional courts such as 
the Court of Treason in 1952, the Court of the Revolution in 1953, and the People's Court in 1954.
  
213 
Because of their far-reaching mandates, limited procedural guidelines and lack of appeals process, 
these courts served the regime to sidestep the regular court system.214 Moreover, in view of the 
increasing pressure on the part of the Lawyers' Syndicate and the Judges' Association for judicial and 
political reforms, Nasser issued an executive decree, which prompted the dismissal of several judges 
of the Court of Cassation and judicial officials as well as the dissolution of the board of Judges' 
Association.215 With the objective to eliminate any further resistance, the Supreme Council of Judicial 
Organizations was established, which gave the executive power extensive control over appointments, 
promotions as well as disciplinary actions in the judiciary.216
 The new Constitution of 1958 provided for some political participation. For instance, it ensured a 
presidential system in which the President was to be confirmed by referendum.
 
217 However, the 
Constitution also guaranteed the President's monopoly of power. Articles 65, 111 and 131, for 
example, stipulated that while the National Assembly (NA) "was in charge of the legislative power, the 
president had the right to dissolve the legislature and issue laws-by-decree."218 Furthermore, all 
candidates who run in the elections for the NA had to receive the approval of the NU, which was 
chaired by President. Accordingly, the control over the NU and the NA was centralized in the hands of 
the President,219 which meant that "the parliament lost its autonomy and became totally subordinate to 
the executive power."220
 After the merger between Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958, the UAR 
was dissolved in 1961. In 1964 a new Constitution was established. In addition to reinforcing the 
commitment to Arab socialism, the Constitution provided the President with excessive power. For 
instance, the President “retained the power to appoint and dismiss government ministers and to lay 
down the general policy of the state in all fields and supervise its implementation.”
 
221 Although the 
President's powers in the legislative sphere were confined to periods of the NA's adjournment,222 such 
limitations were bypassed by the almost continuous state of emergency.223
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 After president Nasser's death, Sadat became President in 1970. The beginning of his presidency 
represented a reorientation of Egyptian politics, in the sense that it constituted a "de-Nasserization."224 
In this regard, the introduction of an "open-door policy" including several political and economic 
measures, facilitated a partial political and economic liberalization. For instance, the new Constitution 
of 1971 guaranteed protection against arbitrary arrest and seizure of property,225 and provided for the 
establishment of an independent Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) in 1979. Mandated with 
performing judicial review, the SCC's rulings contributed to the promotion of electoral reform, freedom 
of expression, and protected civil society, opposition and human rights groups from state 
domination.226 Although the SCC allowed the opposition and human rights activists to challenge the 
regime for the first time since the military coup in 1952, the Court also put constrains on their political 
activities. For example, the SCC ruled Egypt's Emergency Security Courts constitutional and delayed 
the issuance of the ruling on the constitutionality of the transfer of civilians to Military Courts.227 Seeing 
that Egypt has been ruled under an almost continuous state of emergency since 1967, “the 
Emergency State Security Courts and, more recently, the Military Courts, have effectively formed a 
parallel legal system with fewer procedural safeguards, serving as ultimate regime check on 
challenges to its power.”228
 With respect to the protection of political rights and freedoms, the 1971 Constitution guaranteed, for 
instance, the freedom of press in Article 48 and the freedom of expression in Article 47. The 
constitution also protected the freedom of peaceful assembly "without the need for prior notice” in 
Article 54, and the right to form civil societies in Article 56.
 
229 However, most of these rights and 
freedoms were still defined by law, for example, public meetings, processions and gatherings were 
only allowed “within the limits of the law.”230 Additionally, the Emergency Law prohibited the 
organization of public meetings by parties without the Ministry of Interior's prior permission and further 
subjected them to the state security forces' supervision.231 The Emergency Law also granted the 
President a wide range of powers to censor the media, which allowed for the confiscation and the 
closing of newspapers “on the grounds of public safety and national security.”232
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 The 1971 Constitution also retained many of the features of the previous constitutions. For 
example, it granted the President enough "powers to overshadow and overrule the NA, renamed as 
the People's Assembly (PA)."233 In this respect, the ability of the legislature to change the government 
or legislation was severely constrained.234 The Constitution further provided for the Socialist 
Prosecutor General "whose actual function was to prosecute Sadat's political opponents outside the 
main course of the legal system while at the same time looking into corruption cases.235
 Since its establishment in 1962, the ASU continued to be the only political organization until the 
creation of three political forums within the framework of the ASU in 1976. These forums included the 
Liberal Socialist Forum (the right), Egypt's Arab Socialist Forum (the centre) and the Nationalist 
Progressive Unionist Forum (the left).
 
236 In contrast, other major political forces, such as, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the Neutral or the Nasserites were excluded from the ASU.237 Nevertheless, the 
recognition of other political trends in the ASU represented a departure from the previous regime 
under which the ASU was dominated by Nasser's ideology.238 All three political forums were allowed to 
participate in the elections of the PA in 1976, which therefore were the first plural parliamentary 
elections held since the 1952 military coup.239
 Following the issuance of Law 40/1977 that allowed for a multi-party system, five political parties 
were established. In addition to the forums which were transformed into political parties, in 1978 other 
parties were formed including the  Neutral Party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), which replaced 
Egypt's ruling ASU, and the Socialist Labour Party.
 
240 Despite these democratic measures that 
facilitated political participation, Law 40/1977 also introduced restrictions with respect to the  formation 
and operation of political parties. In this regard, the Committee of Political Parties' Affairs was tasked 
with approving newly established parties. The Committee was empowered to "ban the activities of any 
political party, if proven that the party or its leaders or members violated the Constitution or did not 
abide by its declared program."241 Between 1977 and 2007, the Committee's approval was limited to 
four parties, which included the Nation Party in 1983, the National Reconciliation Party in 2000, the 
Tomorrow Party in 2004 and the Democratic Front Party in 2007.242
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Administrative Court rulings.243 Law 40/1977 also prohibited the legalization of parties that were based 
on ethnic or religious identities. This provision undermined moderate Islamist movements, such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood, to form political parties, in spite of the fact that these movements accounted for 
the largest constituency.244 Moreover, while political parties were allowed to issue their own 
newspaper, similar to all radio and television services, these newspapers continued to be controlled by 
the regime.245 These restrictions on the freedom of press occasionally resulted in the shutting down of 
opposition newspapers that were viewed as “extremist in their criticisms of the regime."246
 In consequence of massive food riots against economic policies in 1977, the regime introduced a 
series of decrees putting further constrains on political freedoms and rights.
 
247 For instance, Law 
33/1978 empowered the Committee of Political Parties' Affairs "to deprive any person from belonging 
to political parties or practising political rights, if it was proven by the Socialist Prosecutor-General that 
this person contributed to the corruption of political life in the country, or threatened national unity and 
social peace."248 Furthermore, Law 95/1980 made any acts punishable, if they were found to be in 
contradiction with morality. In this regard, the criteria of morality were to be determined by the regime. 
This provided the government with extraordinary powers "to punish any person or political party that 
criticized the president, the ruling party or any other government-related institutions."249
 In 1979 elections for the PA were hold, which resulted in an overwhelming majority for Sadat's NDP 
with 330 seats, whereas, for instance, only 29 seats went to the Socialist Labour Party, two to the 
Socialist Liberal Party and ten to independents.
 
250 In 1980 the 1971 Constitution was amended, 
introducing a clause that changed the re-election of the President from two terms to an indefinite 
number of terms. The constitutional amendments also replaced the unicameral parliamentary system 
with a bicameral one through the establishment of the Shura Council (SC)251 in order to complement 
the PA.252 Given its solely advisory competencies, the SC possessed no legislative powers,253
 Despite the restrictions imposed on political rights and freedoms, the presidency of Sadat 
represented a major shift from the military one-party system under President Nasser. In contrast to 
Nasser's regime that was directed towards controlling all aspects of political life, Sadat introduced a 
process of democratic reform in the mid-1970s that permitted to some extent political participation, 
especially, through the formation of political parties. However, in spite of the establishment of a multi-
 but 
served the regime in controlling the media. In this respect, the SC replaced the ASU, which was 
abolished in 1979.  
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party system and the limited guarantee of political rights and freedoms, the regime continued to 
oppress its opposition. For instance, following the resistance against the peace treaty with Israel, the 
government arrested approximately 1000 opponents from across the entire political spectrum.254 This 
has also often been viewed as resulting in Sadat's assassination by an Islamist military officer in 
1981.255
 
 Overall, while the existence of multi-partyism and elections provided for some measures of 
participation, these were rather formal than substantive in nature, as they neither allowed the people to 
participate in the decision-making process of the state, nor in determining the nature of the political 
system. 
2.  Mubarak's Democratic Exceptionalism 
Mubarak came into power in 1981. Although Mubarak renewed the state of emergency in response to 
Sadat's assassination, his regime demonstrated relative tolerance towards political parties in the 
1980s.256 For example, political prisoners were released and political parties that had been banned or 
suspended under the Sadat's regime, were allowed to resume their political activities and 
participation.257 Moreover, moderate Islamist movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, were 
permitted to participate in the PA elections via alliances with legal political parties. Likewise, they were 
granted the right to publish newspapers and to voice their opposition in the media.258
 Following the amendment of the 1972 Electoral Law, a system of proportional representation was 
established in 1983. Based on this system, political parties had to submit a list of candidates for each 
of the 48 constituencies.
 
259 In this regard, the representation of political parties in the PA was 
dependent on whether these parties had succeeded in obtaining at least eight percent of the national 
vote.260 Consequently, particularly small parties were deprived by the amendment from  representation 
in the PA. In view of their limited resources, small parties were neither able to provide a list of 
candidates for all constituencies, nor to obtain eight percent of the national vote in the elections. The 
amendment also banned "independent candidates,” which excluded any candidate without party 
affiliation from competing in the elections.261 In spite of these limitations, the elections for the PA in 
1984 were more competitive than previous elections "since the re-introduction of political pluralism in 
1977."262 For example, the Muslim Brotherhood was permitted to compete via alliance with the Neutral 
Party. However, given that no other party had passed the eight percent threshold of the national vote, 
representation in the PA was limited to the ruling NDP with 390 seats and the Neutral Party in alliance 
with the Muslim Brotherhood with 58 seats.263
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 Due to the fact that the banning of independent candidates in the amended Electoral Law of 1983 
was considered unconstitutional and in contradiction to individual rights protected in the 1971 
Constitution, the SCC declared the PA elections of 1984 invalid. Though, the newly issued amendment 
left the system of party list-based elections unchanged, it allowed independent candidates to 
participate in the elections. The new elections resulted once more in an overwhelming majority of the  
NDP, which won 308 seats. Besides the Neutral Party that won 36 seats, the Labour Party in alliance 
with the Muslim Brotherhood, became the largest opposition party with 56 seats, in addition to 48 
seats won by independent candidates.264
 A ruling of the SCC in 1990 finally changed the system of party-list based elections and replaced it 
with an individual candidacy system "according to which the country was divided into 222 electoral 
constituencies with each constituency electing two deputies for the PA."
 
265 This ruling constituted a 
major victory for the opposition parties, even though their participation in the electoral process 
continued to be restricted by the Emergency Law. Therefore, major opposition parties refused their 
participation in the 1990 elections in protest of the Emergency Law.266 Consequently, the election 
resulted in major victory of the NDP with 386 seats. Only five seats were won by the Unionist Party 
and 57 seats by independent candidates.267
 In contrast to the constitutional and political processes in the 1980s that had facilitated people's 
participation to some extend, a process of "deliberalization"
 
268 increasingly constrained participation 
and political rights in the 1990s. For instance, in 1992 the amendment to the Law of Political Parties 
imposed further constrains on the formation of parties. This law barred any political activity on the part 
of a party's founding members as long as the new party had not received the approval of the 
Committee of Political Parties' Affairs.269 Moreover, a major obstacle to people's ability to participate in 
the political process represented the amendment of Law 97/1992 in the Penal Code that widened the 
definition of terrorism. The law defined terrorism as "any act that entailed the use of force or the threat 
of use of force in order to undermine public order and threaten social peace and security."270 
Additionally, the amendment stipulated harsher penalties, for example, acts of terrorism were referred 
to the Supreme State Security and the Military Courts whose rulings were not subject to appeal, could 
entail death penalty or hard labour and could be altered or dismissed by the President.271
 The government also amended the law governing civil society organizations. "Since Nasser, the 
mandate and activities of civil society organizations had been regulated by Law 32/1964, which 
brought all civil societies activities under the control of […] the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA)."
  
272
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which was empowered to deny the registration of any NGO “whose objectives were regarded as a 
threat to the security and social order of the republic."273 In 1999, the government issued Law 153 to 
govern the activities of civil society organizations, which was changed to Law 84 in 2002.274 Generally, 
the law provided MOSA with more oversight authority over the activities of civil society organizations. 
For instance, the law "barred NGOs from receiving funding from any foreign donor, collecting 
donations from the public, or carrying out fund-raising activities without prior permission” from the 
Ministry."275 Further, the law prohibited NGOs from engaging in any political activity "covered by laws 
governing political parties or any activity that was political in nature."276
 As a result of the restrictions on political activities and the high level of regime interference in the 
electoral process through fraud and repression,
 
277 the 1995 elections for the PA resulted in a major 
victory for the NDP.278 Given that these elections had not been supervised by public sector officials not 
by judges, the SCC declared the elections invalid. Even though, the following PA elections were 
conducted under the supervision of judges, this did not prevent the regime from interfering in the 
electoral process. "The judges were in control inside the polling stations, however outside the stations, 
security forces harassed opposition candidates and voters and arrested many candidates” belonging 
to opposition groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood.279 As a consequence, the NDP won the 
elections with 172 seats and 216 additional seats won by independent candidates that joined the ruling 
party.280 Only seven seats were won by the Neutral Party and 37 seats went to independent 
candidates including 17 seats that were obtained by the Muslim Brotherhood.281
 In 2005 Mubarak's regime introduced additional changes to the Constitution including an 
amendment to Article 76 allowing for multiple presidential candidates.
 
282 Despite the establishment of 
a system of competitive presidential elections, the requirements for the candidate eligibility continued 
to be restricted. In this regard, only parties that had existed for at least five years and had won at least 
three percent of the seats in PA and SC, were allowed to nominate a presidential candidate.283 This 
prevented "any party from nominating a popular figure outside the small circle of mostly elderly, well-
known politicians."284 In addition, Law 76/2005 required that each candidate had to be approved by at 
least 250 members of the PS, SC and local council.285
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the presidential elections.286
 The first multi-candidate presidential elections were held in 2005. Although ten candidates 
competed in the elections, Mubarak succeeded in winning the election with 88 percent of the vote.
 
287 
Likewise, in the PA elections the NDP won with 149 seats, in addition to 167 seats won members of 
the ruling party who had competed as independent candidates. Further, 88 seats went to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which became for the first time the largest opposition in the PA.288. Despite, the regime's 
continuing interference in the electoral process "through vote buying, fraud and intimidation,"289 the 
Muslim Brotherhood candidates "were allowed to campaign much more openly than in the past albeit 
as independents.”290
 The regime responded to the Muslim Brotherhood electoral success with de-liberalizing measures 
such as the systematic crack down on political opponents and popular protests.
  
291 Moreover, Mubarak 
extended the state of emergency for another two years.292 In 2007, the government issued 34 
constitutional amendments putting further limitations on political rights and competition.293 For 
example, the amendment to Article 5 on party pluralism excluded the "conduct of 'any political activity' 
or the establishment of 'any political parties' within 'any religious frame of reference or on any religious 
basis or on the basis of gender or origin'."294 Accordingly, the regime could "charge any religious 
institution or civil organization with involvement in religiously inspired political activities."295 Further, the 
amendment to Article 179, gave the regime the right to suspend the constitutional Articles 41, 44 and 
45 in cases concerning the combat of terrorism.296 These Articles "were dedicated respectively to the 
prohibition of arbitrary arrest, requirement of a judicial warrant for home visits and the protection of the 
privacy of communications."297 Additionally, this amendment empowered the president to refer cases 
related to the “security” of the state including crimes of “terrorism” to exceptional courts including 
Military Courts.298 Operating within the framework of the state of emergency and the Emergency Law, 
these exceptional courts undermined the ordinary court system to the extent that the  separation 
between judicial system and the executive branch of the government was bypassed.299
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 Following these constitutional amendments, the PA elections in 2010 were marked by widespread 
violations including mass arbitrary arrests of hundreds of opposition candidates before the vote and 
restrictions on public campaigning.300 The election resulted in the overwhelming victory of the NDP, 
which won 420 seats, whereas the opposition parties won only 15 seats including six seats for the 
Wafd Party, five seats for the Unionist Party as well as one seat for each of the smaller parties such as 
the Tomorrow Party, the Social Justice, the Generation as well as the Peace Party.301 The Muslim 
Brotherhood was only able to win one seat, as most of the seats won by the independent candidates 
went to the NDP.302
 In spite of the introduction of measures to democratization, including some limited advances in 
political rights such as the freedom of press, “democracy” under Mubarak remained restricted to the 
level of formal electoral participation. Therefore, democratization was confined to the extent that it did 
not threaten to undermine the monopoly of the regime. For instance, while the number of political 
parties increased from five to 24,
 
303
 The state of emergency was first enforced by Nasser at the beginning of the 1967 War. Since then, 
Egypt has been almost continuously governed under the Emergency Law.
 political competition continued to be limited through the repression 
of the opposition and electoral manipulation. In particular the Emergency Law served the regime to 
bypass the Constitution and to constrain political rights and freedoms. 
304 After Sadat's 
assassination in 1981, President Mubarak reinstated the state of emergency state, which was again 
renewed in 2010.305 The Emergency Law provides the government with far-reaching power, for 
instance, to arrest anyone who “threatens national security”306 or is suspected of “representing danger 
to [...] the public order.”307 Furthermore, the law provides the President with the authority “to monitor 
and seize all publications, advertisements, announcements, or other means of disseminating 
information.”308
 As party to the ICCPR, Egypt has the obligation under Article 25, 18, 19 and 21 to guarantee 
political participation, the freedom of expression as well as to protect the right to peaceful assembly 
and the freedom of association.
 
309 However, in a time of public emergency limited derogations to these 
articles, except for Article 18 on freedom of expression, are allowed.310
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provisions of the Covenant must be of an exceptional and temporary nature" and be "limited to the 
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.”311 However, these requirements are not met 
in Egypt, given that the state of emergency has been rather the norm than the exceptionality.312 In this 
respect, the limitations imposed by the state of emergency on political rights and freedoms reduced 
democratic reforms to cosmetic measures. This “democratic exceptionalism” that limited democracy to 
the level of formal participation, was imposed by the regime as strategy of “democratization,” holding 
the view that economic reforms must proceed political changes.313
 
 
 
B.  Economic Dimension of Self-Determination 
1.  Integration into the Global Economy 
The integration into the global economy began under Sadat's "open-door policy" in 1974. Introducing a 
program of economic liberalization, this policy aimed at "shifting Egypt away from Nasser's centralized 
economy and state-led development, towards a model of capitalist economy."314 Given that the 
Egyptian economy was in extreme disrepair,315 Sadat turned almost immediately to foreign sources of 
capital to overcome the domestic shortfall.316 However, the fear of being expropriated held foreign 
investors off entering the Egyptian market,317 despite the government's issuance of Law 43/1974 that 
guaranteed protection against sequestration and nationalization.318 Therefore, in 1976, Sadat 
concluded a stabilization agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).319 This agreement 
included measures such as the liberalization of imports, as well as the "reduction of the deficit by 
controlling wages and cutting subsidies in the areas of basic staples, energy and government 
services.”320
 The implementation of cutting subsidies, in particular, with respect to food, resulted in the outbreak 
of riots in 1977. As a consequence of the social unrest, the regime adopted "a limited version of 
economic liberalization under which it would be committed to opening up the economy for foreign 
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investment, but without compromising its corporatist role and welfare obligations."321 Throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, the government continued to follow a etatist model of development with the 
objective of avoiding political instability through mass protests. Accordingly, the state remained the 
main actor in the economy with respect to areas such as basic social services and subsidies, resource 
allocation and employment.322
 In contrast in the 1990s, the government under Mubarak gave up on the etatist model of 
development to foster the integration into the global economy through increased economic 
liberalization. In this context, the regime committed to the implementation of the Economic Reform and 
Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) under the supervision of the IMF and World Bank (WB). On 
the one hand, the ERSAP was concerned with "short-term 'stabilization' which lay in the domain of the 
IMF, and included fiscal and monetary reforms to reduce public consumption, increase public savings, 
and achieve sustainable economic growth."
  
323 On the other hand, ERSAP initiated "long-term 
'structural adjustment' which was the responsibility of the WB and included measures such as public-
enterprise reform, domestic price liberalization, foreign trade liberalization, and private sector 
reform."324
 The implementation of the ERSAP resulted in strong economic growth, notably, between 2003 and 
2007.
 
325 However, the promotion of market-oriented reforms primarily benefited the interests of the 
regime and its supporters, allowing them to reinforce their power, while excluding the rest of the 
population from sharing in the economic development.326
 In the context of the ERSAP, the state increasingly withdrew from its role as "primary economic 
actor to a more subservient role in which it became mainly committed to support the private sector and 
provide a conducive business environment for foreign investment."
 Particularly, the deterioration of the socio-
economic conditions through the rise of unemployment and poverty that accompanied the retreat of 
the state from welfare services, contributed to the exclusion of large parts of the population.  
327 In order to reduce the state 
involvement in the economy including the public expenditure, subsidies for social services were 
increasingly declined.328 For example, in 2006 the fuel subsidy was reduced, which resulted in a 30 
percent increase in the price of fuel.329 Other subsidy cuts affected, for instance, the prices of 
electricity and transportation.330
 The withdrawal of the state from the economy also increased the level of unemployment. For 
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instance, the state abandoned its commitment to job creation in state-owned enterprises or through 
public investment. This measure "was not matched with a significant growth in private investment, 
whether domestic or foreign."331 Moreover, with respect to the restructuring and privatization of the 
public sector, the regime implemented among other measures "a policy of forced 'early retirement' of 
public sector employees in order to reduce labour cost in the production process" in state-owned 
enterprises.332 As a result of this policy approximately 450,000 public sectors employees had to leave 
their jobs between 1993 and 2002.333
 Other measures that were implemented included the liberalization of price controls that raised the 
prices of basic goods such as sugar, bread and tea.
 
334 The cost of living was further increased through 
the devaluations of the Egyptian pound by almost 100 percent in the context of the reform of the 
exchange rate. The devaluations advanced in particular the prices of energy and imported 
commodities, including basic food items such as wheat and flour increased. For instance, the price of 
bread was raised by 36,4 percent, food oils by 60 percent, sugar by 20,8 percent in 2008.335 However, 
the increase of the cost of living was not accompanied with higher salaries as the reduction of public 
expenditure to attract private investment was also directed towards the decrease of the cost of 
labour.336
 These and other initiatives that were taken under the ERSAP contributed to the deterioration of 
socio-economic conditions. In this regard, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
observed that “structural adjustment programmes and economic liberalization policies [...] impeded the 
implementation of the [ICESCR]'s provisions, particularly with regard to the most vulnerable groups of 
Egyptian society.”
 
337 This tendency is evident in the rise of poverty. According to the WB, absolute 
poverty338 increased from 16,7 percent in 2000 to 19,6 percent in 2005339 and 23,4 percent in 2008.340 
Given that “participation and influence over decision-making are usually dependent on the degree of 
access to material resources available," the deterioration of socio-economic conditions also 
constrained the opportunities of political participation.341
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parts of the population from politics.342 In contrast to the lack of access to resources of the majority of 
the Egyptian population, other groups, particularly, business groups gained access to resources and 
political influence.343
 Through the implementation of selective economic reforms, the regime protected the interests of 
influential groups and regime supporters including the military.
 
344 In this respect, economic 
liberalization served the regime “to re-distribute privileges to regime supporters and co-opt important 
segments of the private sectors” in order to reinforce its social basis and guarantee its electoral 
support.345
 
  
2.  Economic Liberalization and Democratization 
Economic liberalization aimed at integrating Egypt into the global economy contributed to “an 
environment of added constraints over political participation and pluralism.”346 In particular, the socio-
economic impact of the structural adjustment program triggered popular resistance, to which the 
regime responded with repression.347 In this regard, rather than advancing a process of 
democratization, the implementation of economic liberalization required the existence of an 
authoritarian state. While the regime “reduced its developmental role, [it] maintained the monopoly 
over political power [...] to enforce its political and economic agenda through the use of coercion and 
repression of political and civil rights.”348
 Economic liberalization and democratization are often assumed to be “two mutually-reinforcing 
processes, arguing that economic growth and liberalization largely depend on open competition and 
predictability that could only be found in democratic societies.”
  
349 Therefore, democracy is considered 
as the political equivalent of the free market. In this respect, the competition between individuals in the 
political sphere is viewed as bearing resemblance to the interaction of the forces in the economic 
sphere of the free market.350
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economic growth."351
 As the case of Egypt has illustrated, economic liberalization hindered rather than facilitated 
democratization. As economic liberalization benefited mainly influential groups with connections to the 
regime,
 
352 these groups had no interest in contesting the existing power structure.353 In this context, 
democratization was perceived as threat to the political status quo as well as the established socio-
economic privileges enjoyed by the regime and its supporters, given that democratization raises 
opportunities for those disadvantaged by economic liberalization to organize and eventually block the 
implementation of policies that are not directed towards the benefit of the people.354 However, this 
means that economic liberalization in Egypt has neither empowered nor benefited the people on a 
general basis, for instance, by making the people the centre of the political decision-making. In this 
sense, the requirements for the liberalization of the Egyptian economy appeared to be incompatible 
with “those requirements necessary for the institutionalization of democratic principles and 
procedures,” such as the guarantee of rights and freedoms that allow for the expression of the popular 
will.355 In view of the deterioration of socio-economic conditions among the majority of the Egyptian 
population as a result of economic liberalization,356 the regime responded with authoritarian measures 
to contain social unrest and political opposition, given that the financial assistance provided by the WB 
and IMF was considered indispensable to the survival of the Egyptian economy.357 Accordingly, 
democracy was perceived as irreconcilable with the adjustment to the global economy, in particular, 
because democratization might open up political space for popular mobilization, “which could in turn 
undermine the political base of the regime.”358 In this respect, the erosion of political rights occurred 
simultaneously with the implementation of economic liberalization.359 Therefore, instead of advancing 
a process of democratization, the implementation of economic liberalization contributed to the 
stabilization rather than the deconstruction of authoritarianism in Egypt.360
 In spite of the diversity of the countries in the MENA and beyond,
 
361 in which “democracy has 
stagnated or been rolled back, most have ended up in a similar state - not with full-fledged 
dictatorships, but with a particular style of semi-authoritarian regime” or low-intensity democracy.362
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Those critical of the neo-liberal globalization argue that “to free global markets from state control 
through deregulation,” for instance, by means of the privatisation of public enterprises and the 
institutionalisation of flexible labour markets, has created a “minimalist state.”363 Even though, this 
concept entails an elected government, it constrains peoples' right to political participation, which is 
central to substantive democracy and popular sovereignty.364
 The emergence of global markets “operating as extra-juridical, extra-jurisdictional or supra-national 
phenomena” challenges the very notion of democracy.
  
365 In this regard, the inability of national 
governments to impose rules and regulations to control the forces of the global market has 
undermined democratic accountability and political legitimacy.366 Moreover, the lack of democratic 
participation of peoples in the global economy,367 “precludes the exercise of real national sovereignty 
and the implementation of truly democratic decisions” on the national level.368 In this context, 
particularly, the imposition of structural adjustment programs on governments by international 
institutions such as the IMF and WB, directly impacts upon peoples' right to determine the nature of 
their economic and political system. In addition to regulating the labour market, structural adjustment 
programs also shape the extent to which people can access, for instance, education and pensions. In 
this respect, they set the policy choices available to governments in pivotal areas of political and 
constitutional authority.369 Consequently, the failure of international institutions to introduce 
“mechanisms by which they can be held accountable to local people,”370 compromises the right of 
peoples to political and economic self-determination.371
 In order to enhance the interaction between national governments and the global market, the Post-
Washington-Consensus
  
372, for instance, stresses the importance of democratic institutions to improve 
economic performance of nation states.373 However, this not only reduces the concept of democracy 
to the political sphere of the nation state, but also takes existing power structures at the global level, 
for example between powerful and less powerful states, as predetermined.374
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making global institutions of capital accountable, representative institutions at the national level, “no 
matter how 'democratic' in form,” will simply be a reflection of the undemocratic power relations of 
society.375
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The popular demonstrations in Egypt, which led to the resignation of President Mubarak on February 
11, 2011 have not ended, albeit the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which has 
assumed the control of the government, declared its intention to introduce a process to democratic 
transition.376 The principal goal of the protests continues to constitute the demand for the radical 
change of the system defined by corruption, oppression and a tightly restricted space for political 
organization and participation.377 In this regard, the protesters' demands for “bread, freedom, and 
social justice”378
 Since the establishment of the Egyptian Republic under President Nasser, political self-
determination has been state-centred, given that the authoritarian state structures rather allowed for 
the imposition of reforms from above than the expression of the popular will. Although under President 
Sadat the existence of multi-partyism and elections provided for some measures of participation, these 
were rather formal than substantive in nature as they neither allowed the people to participate in the 
decision-making process, nor to determine the nature of the political system. Likewise, under 
President Mubarak “democracy” remained restricted to the level of formal electoral participation, 
despite the introduction of some democratic measures including limited advances in political rights. 
Politically, self-determination was thus confined to the extent that it did not threaten to undermine the 
monopoly of the regime. 
 entail the ”non-ideological” desire to recapture the political sphere to political and 
economic self-determination. 
 With respect to the economic sphere, the implementation of market-oriented reforms, which began 
under Sadat, aimed at the transformation of Nasser's state-led economy into a capitalist model of 
economy. The economic liberalization and structural adjustment resulted in strong macro economic 
growth, though this primarily benefited the regime and its supporters, notably the business groups and 
the military. In this context, the deterioration of the socio-economic conditions contributed to the 
exclusion of large parts of the population. The increase in poverty also limited the opportunities of the 
majority of the Egyptians to political participation. In this regard, democratization was perceived as 
threat to the political status quo and the established socio-economic privileges enjoyed by the regime 
and its supporters. Accordingly, economic liberalization in Egypt has neither empowered nor benefited 
the majority of the Egyptians to the extent that it allowed for people's self-determination. 
 As the decades of market-oriented reforms have illustrated, economic liberalization in Egypt 
benefited mainly influential groups with connections to the regime, whereas the vast majority of the 
population suffered under deteriorating living conditions. Therefore, instead of advancing a process of 
democratization, the implementation of economic liberalization contributed to the consolidation rather 
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than the deconstruction of authoritarianism. In this regard, the imposition of structural adjustment 
packages by international institutions has directly impacted upon peoples' right to political and 
economic self-determination. Hence, the establishment of substantive democracy at the national level 
is unlikely without making international institutions including the “private” domain of the global markets 
accountable. In this context, the demonstrations that erupted in Egypt on January 25, 2011, can not be 
reduced to the question of “democratic transition” as long as the lack of democracy at the global level 
precludes exercise of real sovereignty and the implementation of truly democratic decisions at the 
national level. 
 
